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“As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger 
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought 
to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same 
nation, though personally unknown to him.  This point being once reached, 
there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to 
the men of all nations and races.” 
 
Charles Darwin1 
                                                 
 This article has been reprinted, with permission, as a tribute to 
Professor Raymond Cross’ work in Indian law, dedication to Indian Country, and 
support of the Public Land & Resources Law Review.  The original article appeared 
in the Tulsa Law Review at 39 TULSA L. REV. 369 (2003).  Minor changes were made 
to address typographical errors and formatting.   
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“The whole world is coming, 
A nation is coming, a nation is coming, 
The Eagle has brought the message to the tribe. 
The father says so, the father says so. 
Over the whole earth they are coming. 
The buffalo are coming, the buffalo are coming, 
The Crow has brought the message to the tribe, 
The father says so, the father says so.” 
 
Sioux Ghost Dance Chant2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Responding to the Realist Critique of the Federal Trust Doctrine 
 
 An old European history professor of mine described 
Charlemagne’s ninth century Holy Roman Empire as “neither holy, nor 
Roman, nor an empire.”3  Likewise, legal critics of the federal trust duty 
characterize it, like the Holy Roman Empire of old, as a legal and political 
oxymoron.  In all candor, they say, it is neither federal, nor a trust, nor a 
“duty.”  These realist critics argue that the federal trust duty has proven to 
be a largely illusory doctrinal resource for the Indian peoples’ protection.4  
They claim, with justification, that it has failed to protect from federal 
depredation or despoliation what the Indian peoples value most—their 
lands, their rights of self-governance, and their cultural and religious 
freedoms.5  
 As proof of their claim, the critics cite the ominous conclusion by 
one of the trust doctrine’s most ardent advocates, Professor Reid Peyton 
Chambers.  Chambers concluded in perhaps the leading law review article 
                                                 
1.  ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY III 
(Pantheon Bks. 2000). 
2.  FREDERICK TURNER, BEYOND GEOGRAPHY: THE WESTERN SPIRIT 
AGAINST THE WILDERNESS 290 (Viking Press 1980). 
3.  Voltaire is credited with coining this clever phrase in the eighteenth 
century.  See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 174. 
4. Because the Lone Wolf doctrine authorizes Congress to unilaterally 
abrogate Indian treaties or agreements and thereby take Indian lands or resources at 
will, some legal commentators deem the federal trust doctrine as being legally 
insufficient to protect the Indian peoples from future governmental abuse of the 
federal plenary power doctrine.  See Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth 
Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L. 
REV. 245, 254–55 (1982). 
5. See id. 
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on this subject: “This power of Congress recognized under the Lone Wolf 
rendition of the [Indian] trust responsibility is manifestly awesome, 
perhaps unlimited . . . . For while courts recognize that Congress has a trust 
responsibility, they uniformly regard it as essentially a moral obligation, 
without justiciable standards for its enforcement.”6 
 See, the critics say, even the most ardent advocate of this doctrine 
admits that the federal courts will idly sit by as a future Congress may 
decide, in its wisdom as the Indian peoples’ guardian, to embark on a new 
and starkly pro-assimilationist Indian program that once again shrinks the 
land base reserved to the Indian peoples.7  
 But even more disturbing, these critics argue, is Professor 
Chambers’ supposed remedial approach that ostensibly blunts the adverse 
future impacts of Congress’ exercise of its plenary power over Indian lands 
and resources.  Chambers draws a practical distinction between what he 
views as the judicially enforceable Indian trust obligations owed by the 
federal executive to the Indian peoples as against the judicially non-
enforceable moral obligations that Congress owes to the Indian peoples.8  
 Chambers asserts that the federal trust duty is the appropriate 
judicial means for regulating federal administrative behaviors and 
regulatory actions undertaken by the now multifarious federal “Indian 
agents” who are charged with carrying out congressionally declared Indian 
policies.9  In his law review article on the subject, Chambers states: 
 
If, as the Cherokee cases suggest, a chief objective of the 
trust responsibility is to protect tribal status as self-
governing entities, executive extinguishment of the tribal 
land base diminishes the territory over which tribal 
authority is exercised and thereby imperils fulfillment of 
the guarantee of tribal political and cultural autonomy.  If 
this is the correct interpretation of the trust responsibility, 
equitable relief in appropriate cases seems essential.  Such 
relief is particularly vital to accommodate the conflicts 
between Indian trustee responsibilities and competing 
                                                 
6. Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust 
Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1226–27 (1975) (footnote omitted). 
7. Newton illustrates this point by hypothesizing a contemporary Indian 
allotment act that once again shrinks the Indian peoples’ reserved land base. She 
argues that nothing in present federal Indian law would effectively prevent Congress 
from doing so.  Newton, supra note 4, at 261–63. 
8.  Chambers, supra note 6, at 1247–48. 
9.  Id. 
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government projects that affect countless federal 
agencies.10   
 
 Aside from the obvious comment that it probably doesn’t make a 
real difference to the affected Indian people whether it is Congress or the 
federal executive who acted wrongfully in extinguishing their tribal land 
base, the realist critics level a more serious and potentially devastating 
charge against Chambers’ supposed remedial theory and approach for the 
judicial enforcement of the federal trust duty.11  The critics contend that, 
as far as the United States Supreme Court is concerned given its recent 
decision in United States v. Navajo Nation,12 there is no independent legal 
basis for imposing liability on federal Indian trust administrators for their 
alleged mismanagement of Indian trust resources, apart from any such 
liability specifically created by statutory imposition.13  If Indian 
advocates—and I count myself in their company—are to continue to 
espouse the federal trust doctrine as a meaningful legal resource for the 
Indian peoples, then I believe we must respond to what the legal realists 
regard as their devastating criticisms of that ostensible doctrine.  Because 
I do believe that a vibrant and judicially enforceable federal trust doctrine 
is essential to the future cultural and social survival of the Indian peoples, 
a concerted scholarly inquiry must be undertaken by Indian advocates to 
respond to the realist critique of this doctrine.  
 There are two possible honest responses, I believe, to the realists’ 
claims about the illusory character of the federal trust duty.  Option one 
requires us to work internally, “inside history” so to speak, in an effort to 
breathe new life into the dying federal trust doctrine.  This content-based 
approach, as I call it, seeks to reconnect the contemporary federal trust 
duty doctrine to those foundational Indian law principles established by 
the historic treaty-making era between the Indian peoples and the federal 
government.  Only by reconnecting these historic principles to 
contemporary federal Indian law can a meaningful content be conferred 
on a now empty federal trust doctrine. 
                                                 
10.  Id. at 1236 (footnote omitted). 
11. See generally Paul Frye, A Travesty of a Mockery of a Sham: The 
Federal Trust Duty and Indian Self-Determination, ROCKY MT. SPEC. INST. ON NAT. 
RESOURCES DEV. & ENVTL. REG. IN INDIAN COUNTRY, PAPER NO. 2-B (unpublished 
manuscript 1999) (copy on file with author). 
12. 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (“Navajo Nation”). 
13.  The Navajo Nation Court held that “[t]o state a litigable claim, a tribal 
plaintiff must invoke a rights-creating source of substantive law that ‘can fairly be 
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages 
sustained.”’  Id. at 503 (quoting U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983) (“Mitchell 
II”)). 
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 The content-based approach argues that the foremost principle of 
federal Indian law, that of inherent tribal sovereignty, was wrongfully 
disregarded and disrespected by the federal government during the Indian 
allotment and forced assimilation era of the late nineteenth century.  It is 
this key principle that must be restored as the centerpiece of any revitalized 
federal trust doctrine.  But for this content based approach to succeed, its 
advocates must meet the realists’ charge that tribal sovereignty was 
judicially “killed off” during the federal Indian allotment and assimilation 
era of the late nineteenth century.  According to the realist critics, it was 
replaced by the federal plenary power doctrine, the very doctrine that 
Professor Chambers admits is alive and well today. 
 Option two requires us to work externally, “outside of history” so 
to speak.  I call this the process-based approach to revitalizing the federal 
trust doctrine.  It works outside of history on two levels.  First, it 
appropriates those legal fictions created by Chief Justice John Marshall in 
his famed trilogy of Indian law opinions14 as ahistorical and timeless ideals 
that should govern the modern development of the federal trust doctrine.  
Second, it candidly admits that Marshall’s ideals can only be realized in 
an ahistorical era—one free from those destructive biases, prejudices, and 
conflicts that doomed the historic trust-based relationship between the 
federal government and the Indian peoples.  This approach argues that 
Marshall’s original ideation of the Indian peoples as “domestic dependent 
nations” did not contemplate their future integration or assimilation into 
American legal or political society.  Indeed, in Marshall’s scheme of 
things, he thought it highly unlikely that they could be successfully 
integrated into any future American society.  Instead, his legal opinions 
argue that the Indian peoples were guaranteed by their natural inherent 
right, as well as by relevant federal treaties, to remain as the discovering 
Europeans had found them—culturally unassimilable and politically 
distinct Indian peoples.15  More remarkably, Marshall’s opinions 
guaranteed the Indian peoples the active and permanent protection of a 
federal trustee who was charged with ensuring that the Indian peoples 
could forever maintain their “once and future” status as culturally and 
politically distinct entities within the growing American state.16  
                                                 
14.  See Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 
30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
15. The Indian peoples “had always been considered as distinct, 
independent political communities.”  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559. 
16.  Id. at 561–62 (“[T]reaties . . . guaranty to them all the land within 
their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens 
from trespassing on it; and recognize the pre-existing power of the [Indian] nation to 
govern itself.”). 
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 Marshall’s opinions guaranteeing the Indian peoples’ timeless 
right to remain culturally and socially distinct entities, oblivious to the 
obvious ravages of overweening federal Indian policies of the late 
nineteenth century, represent the process based approach to justifying the 
contemporary judicial creation and enforcement of a comprehensive and 
fully enforceable federal trust duty.17  Viewed in this light, Indian self-
determination, the federal government’s contemporary Indian policy, 
represents the legally necessary, but not practically sufficient, predicate 
for the future realization of Marshall’s ahistorical vision of the Indian 
peoples as “domestic dependent nations.”18  
  
B. Defending the Value of Scholarly Theorizing in the Federal Indian 
Law Context 
 
 Well-informed friends of mine believe that the bitter historical 
experiences of the Indian peoples, resulting in part from the federal 
government’s wrong-headed Indian allotment and anti-tribal programs of 
the late nineteenth century, can never be redressed by any contemporary 
federal Indian policy.  Why then, they ask, do I, as an Indian person and 
Indian law teacher, expend so much effort to theorize and write about the 
federal trust doctrine and Indian self-determination?  The “Indian fatalist” 
part of me sympathizes with and understands their point of view.  But the 
“Indian law teacher” part of me is so unduly irked by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s seemingly cavalier opinion in Navajo Nation that I will not rest 
until I respond in detail to what I believe are her mistaken assumptions 
about the incompatible nature of the federal trust duty and Indian self-
determination.19  
 My essay evaluates the prospects for a revitalized federal trust 
doctrine that will complement the Indian peoples’ efforts to realize a 
meaningful measure of self-determination.  I conclude that Justice 
                                                 
17.  Professor Wood’s modern re-conception of the federal trust duty as 
encompassing a sovereign trust in favor of Indian self-determination embodies this 
ideal.  See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A 
New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 
UTAH L. REV. 109, 139–49. 
18. Once fully sovereign peoples, the Indian peoples were reduced to 
“domestic dependent nations” upon their political incorporation into the United States.  
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
19.  Justice Ginsburg concludes that because “[t]he IMLA aims to 
enhance tribal self-determination by giving Tribes, not the Government, the lead role 
in negotiating mining leases with third parties . . . ‘the ideal of Indian self-
determination is directly at odds with Secretarial control over leasing.’”  Id. at 508 
(quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S., 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 230 (2000)). 
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Ginsburg’s opinion in Navajo Nation should be restricted to the peculiar 
facts of that case and should not be read as precluding the future 
development of a vibrant federal trust doctrine that serves as an essential 
complement to the shared federal-Indian goal of self-determination. 
 Indeed, unless the Supreme Court contemplates a perpetual state 
of federal governmental wardship for the large majority of the Indian 
peoples, it must work toward an effective legal synthesis of Marshall’s two 
concepts—the federal trust duty and Indian self-determination.  Congress’ 
strong support for Indian self-determination must be matched by, in my 
estimation, an equally strong judicial commitment to define and enforce 
the federal trust duty.  Given Congress’ declaration that the Indian 
peoples’ trust relationship with the federal government would not be 
jeopardized if they chose to pursue self-determination, I believe Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion in Navajo Nation is manifestly out of step with 
contemporary federal Indian policy. 
 That most famous proponent of Indian self-determination, 
President Richard M. Nixon, proclaimed in his 1970 Indian message to 
Congress, that the Indian peoples need not fear the loss of their rightful 
claims to the active involvement and help of their trustee, the federal 
government, if they decided to work towards self-determination.20  
Furthermore, absent a judicially enforced federal trust doctrine, today’s 
“alphabet soup” of federal executive agencies—the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (“BIA”), Army Corps of Engineers (“ACOE”), Bureau of 
Reclamation (“BOR”), Fish & Wildlife Service (“F&WS”), Forest Service 
(“USFS”), and National Park Service (“NPS”)—will likely exhibit little 
willingness or interest in developing effective “government-to-
government” relationships with the Indian peoples within their respective 
jurisdictions.21  
                                                 
20.  President Nixon’s 1970 Indian Message emphasized that “[t]he time 
has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era 
in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.”  H.R. 
Doc. 91-363, 91st Cong. 1 (July 8, 1970) (Message from the President of the United 
States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy).  Nixon’s message goes on 
to say that the federal government “must make it clear that Indians can become 
independent of Federal control without being cut off from Federal concern and Federal 
support.”  Id. at 3. 
21.  Professor Mary Wood includes these federal agencies within the 
doctrinal compass of the federal trust duty because their “actions . . . may profoundly 
affect Indian land, even though the effects are incidental in that they result from 
general government actions not directed toward tribes or their reservations.” See Mary 
Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust 
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1527.  She rightfully concludes, in my 
estimation, that the federal courts have “envince[d] a strong willingness to impose a 
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 While I am personally reluctant to be drawn into the “how to” 
discussion of Indian self-determination, I believe that the two reasons 
above justify the Supreme Court’s declaration of a new judicial canon of 
Indian statutory construction.  Under this proposed canon, federal judges 
would be required to presume that the existing and future Indian self-
determination statutes, such as the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 
(“IMLA”),22 preserve the historic rights Indians have traditionally enjoyed 
under the federal trust relationship unless Congress clearly expresses its 
intent to the contrary within the “four corners” of a given Indian statute.  
This new canon is the practical and logical corollary of Congress’ declared 
“two track” approach to Indian self-determination.  Track one encourages 
the Indian peoples to assert their inherent rights of self-governance and 
economic or social self-determination.  Track two assures the Indian 
peoples that needed technical and financial support will be forthcoming 
from the federal government to assist them in their efforts.23  
 The plan of my essay is divided into several parts. Part Two 
explores the Marshallian roots of both the federal trust doctrine and Indian 
self-determination ideal.  I argue that, like Romulus and Remus,24 the trust 
doctrine and self-determination ideal are inseparable twins born together 
from Marshall’s famed trilogy.  Part Three assesses the rise of the federal 
plenary power doctrine and its role in fostering the growth of what I call 
the “Indian administrative state.”25  I argue that it was the de facto 
extension of federal administrative control over every aspect of Indian 
peoples’ lives during the late nineteenth century that prompted the 
Supreme Court to recognize an asserted federal plenary power over the 
Indian peoples’ lands and societies.26  Part Four of my essay analyzes the 
                                                 
trust duty to protect Indian lands and corollary resources from adverse agency action 
of an incidental nature.”  Id. at 1532.  However, I am troubled by her conclusion that 
her “expansive approach may not carry over to Tucker Act claims for damage to tribal 
lands or resources resulting from federal incidental actions in the post-Mitchell era.”  
Id.  I worry that she is endorsing, perhaps indirectly, the contemporary Supreme 
Court’s “two tier” theory of federal liability for breaches of the federal government’s 
fiduciary or trust obligations to the Indian peoples. 
22.  52 Stat. 347 (1938). 
23.  See generally Wood, supra note 17, at 139–49. 
24.  Romulus and Remus, in Roman mythology, are the twin founders of 
Rome.  Raised by a defiant mother wolf who, apparently against the grain of “wolf 
tradition,” refused to kill and devour the two orphaned boys, she, instead, chose to 
raise them as her own cubs. 
25.  I have described the BIA’s “assumption by default” of administrative 
and practical control over the Indian peoples’ lives, and resources during the late 
nineteenth century in an earlier law review article. See Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich 
Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893 (2000). 
26.  Id. 
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contemporary Supreme Court’s rediscovery of Marshall’s concept of the 
federal trust doctrine.  I argue that it was the accumulated horrific evidence 
of federal administrative abuse and disregard of the Indians’ inherent 
rights and interests that compelled the Supreme Court to rediscover the 
federal trust doctrine.27  
 Part Five of my essay examines the judicial discomfort and 
ambivalence exhibited in the Supreme Court’s failure to develop a “hard 
muscled” federal trust doctrine as a means of judicially policing the 
contemporary federal-Indian relationship.  I argue that the Court’s 
perceived conflict between the federal agencies’ “public representational” 
responsibilities and those agencies’ “Indian representational” duties 
resulted in a substantial watering down of the federal trust relationship 
with the Indian peoples.28  
 Part Six of my essay critiques Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in 
Navajo Nation.  I argue that her opinion misconceives the appropriate and 
complementary relationship between the federal trust duty and the 
contemporary policy of Indian self-determination.  I conclude my essay 
with a brief sketch of a recommended judicial synthesis of these two 
ageless doctrines of federal Indian law. 
  
 
 
                                                 
27.  In a more recent law review article, I make the same point: 
 
But by the advent of the New Deal Era in the 1930s, America’s 
western frontier had long since closed.  In 1934, Congress 
repudiated its Indian allotment policy and adopted fundamental 
Indian land and governmental reforms as the hallmark of its 
“Indian New Deal.”  These reforms were intended to promote the 
new federal policy of tribal economic development and political 
self-determination. . . . A judicial rethinking of the Johnson-Lone 
Wolf line of decisions that had made Indian allotment and the 
surplus lands sales possible seemed likewise justified. 
 
Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian 
Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 466–67 (1998) (footnotes 
omitted). 
28.  Professor David H. Getches and others questions whether the Court, 
in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), reasoned that “a lesser standard 
necessarily applies to the Indian trust duty when the [Interior] Secretary has to serve 
competing legitimate public interests.”  See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 342–43 (4th ed., West 1998). 
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II.  EXPLORING THE MARSHALLIAN ROOTS OF THE TWIN 
CONCEPTS OF THE FEDERAL TRUST DUTY AND INDIAN SELF-
DETERMINATION 
 
 Option one requires us to examine the history of the federal trust 
doctrine.  My goal is to trace, and hopefully thereby explain, the 
contemporary Supreme Court’s conceptual distinction between two 
aspects of the federal trust duty: the “generalized” Indian trust relationship 
that creates no enforceable legal rights against the United States and the 
“specific” Indian trust relationship that may create enforceable legal rights 
in the Indian peoples.29  I criticize this distinction as reifying those anti-
Indian biases and prejudices of the late nineteenth century and as 
fundamentally at odds with the contemporary congressional policies that 
are strongly supportive of Indian self-determination. 
 
A. Why Indian Advocates Rightfully Seized on the Federal Trust Doctrine 
as the Appropriate Means to Ensure the Indian Peoples’ Cultural and 
Political Survival 
 
 The contemporary Supreme Court’s schizophrenic distinction 
between the “generalized” federal trust duty on the one hand and the 
“specific” federal trust duty on the other derives, in my mind, directly from 
the anti-Indian policies and precedent of the late nineteenth century.  
Indian advocates understandably reject this schizophrenic distinction as 
fundamentally irreconcilable with Chief Justice Marshall’s trilogy of 
Indian law opinions.  His opinions, after all, are the common doctrinal 
source of both the contemporary federal trust duty and Indian self-
determination doctrines.  Indeed, Marshall viewed these two doctrines as 
inextricably and perpetually linked as the opposite sides of the same 
doctrinal coin.  It is no surprise that the traditional Indian rights today 
agitate for a restoration of a federal trust doctrine that takes full account of 
Marshall’s twin conceptions of the historic federal-Indian relationship. 
 My historical critique of today’s schizophrenic federal trust 
doctrine argues that the judicial development of the now two hundred year 
long federal-Indian relationship should have reflected the unfolding of 
these twin Marshallian principles.  A “full blooded” federal trust duty 
doctrine should have developed that would have either obviated or 
mitigated the ravages inflicted by the federal government’s anti-Indian 
                                                 
29.  What I characterize as the contemporary Supreme Court’s “two-
track” theory of the federal trust duty doctrine originated in what is now known as the 
Mitchell line of decisions.  See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206; United States v. Mitchell, 
445 U.S. 535 (1980) (“Mitchell I”). 
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policies of the late nineteenth century.  Such a “hard muscled” federal trust 
doctrine would have recognized and responded to the following social and 
political realities that characterized the federal-Indian relationship of that 
era: 
 
1. The growth of federal power over the internal affairs of 
the Indian peoples: Federal power over the legal and 
political status of the Indian peoples grew steadily more 
intrusive during the late nineteenth century so as to 
eventually encompass virtually every facet of Indian life 
within Indian country.30  
 
2. The deepened vulnerability of the Indian peoples to 
federal power: The Indian peoples’ deepened 
vulnerability to this growing federal power over their 
lives and resources during the late nineteenth century 
rendered them legally and practically dependent on the 
“good faith” of the federal government to exercise that 
power in their best interests.31  
3. Federal agencies’ wrongful and largely unregulated 
exercise of a diffuse and broad discretion over the Indian 
peoples’ lives and resources: Congress’ de jure and de 
facto delegation of its Indian trusteeship power to so-
called “Indian” agencies during the late nineteenth 
century created a bureaucratically-led “shadow” 
government that effectively displaced the traditional self-
                                                 
30.  I earlier explained the federal government’s anti-Indian policies of 
the 1880s to the 1930s in these terms: 
 
The federal government’s resulting war on tribalism from the 
1880s to the 1930s resymbolized the complex, life-affirming, 
cultural and social practices of diverse Indian peoples as the major 
road block to their assimilation into American society.  But freeing 
up Indian lands for non-Indian use, rather than emancipating 
individual tribal members from the clutches of superstition and 
communal land holding, was the real goal of the 1880s Indian 
reform movement. 
 
Cross, supra note 25, at 908 (footnotes omitted). 
31.  Professor Getches concludes that, during the late nineteenth century, 
“[a] consensus developed—among non-Indians, at least—in favor of assimilation as 
the only politically viable alternative to the strong push for the wholesale destruction 
of Indian culture and Indian reservations.”  GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 184. 
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governing institutions of the Indian peoples within Indian 
country.32  
 
 But the federal judiciary, far from inhibiting or channeling the 
overweening growth of this federal power over the Indian peoples, actively 
abetted and aided its growth by crafting judicial principles that rendered it 
impervious to the Indian peoples’ legal or political challenges.  
Furthermore, the contemporary Supreme Court’s schizophrenic federal 
trust doctrine remains wedded to the admittedly failed, and 
congressionally repudiated, anti-Indian policies of that era.  Why the 
Supreme Court remains wedded to the federal plenary power doctrine that 
arose during that era requires us to re-explore the sad and tortuous history 
of the Indian allotment and forced assimilation era. 
  
B. A Brief Digression Criticizing Chief Justice Marshall’s Failure to 
More Completely Define His Twin Conceptions of the Federal Trust 
Duty and Indian Self-Determination 
 
 The three trust generating factors—federal power over Indian 
lands and resources, the Indian peoples’ vulnerability to that power, and 
the inexorable growth of an overweening federal administrative discretion 
over many aspects of Indian life—compelled Chief Justice Marshall to 
analogize the historic federal-Indian relationship as like “a ward to his 
guardian.”33  Marshall emphasized Indian treaty-making and diplomacy as 
the means of reconciling and regulating the twin concepts of Indian 
autonomy or self-determination and the federal guardianship power over 
the Indian peoples.34  While he failed to set definitive substantive limits to 
the federal government’s guardianship power over the Indian peoples, he 
nonetheless articulated a clear concept of Indian self-determination and 
                                                 
32.  See id. at 166–71 (quoting Hearing on H.R. 7902 Before the H.R. 
Comm. Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 428–85 (1934)). 
33.  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.  
34.  Marshall’s attitude toward Indian treaty making is clearly expressed 
in his remarks regarding the Treaty of Holston between the Cherokee Nation and the 
United States: 
 
This treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national character of the 
Cherokees, and their right of self-government; thus guarantying 
their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of course pledging 
the faith of the United States for that protection; has been 
frequently renewed, and is now in full force. 
 
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 556. 
DYING DOCTRINE  PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/9/2017 12:21 PM 
 
  
222 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. Special Issue 
autonomy as an ideational standard requiring both the state and federal 
governments to respect and honor the inherent rights of the Indian peoples.  
He thereby compelled the states to do so in his opinion in Worcester v. 
Georgia.35  Conceivably, he could have extended his Worcester treaty 
supremacy principle so as to bind future Congresses as well, thus using the 
Indian treaty’s negotiated terms and principles to flesh out the legally 
enforceable content of the trust-based relationship between the Indian 
peoples and the federal government.36  
 
III.  HOW THE SUPREME COURT TRANSFORMED MARSHALL’S 
FEDERAL GUARDIANSHIP IDEAL INTO FEDERAL PLENARY 
POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS 
 
A. The Demise of Marshall’s Twin Conceptions of the Historic Federal-
Indian Relationship 
 
 Rather than judicially develop Marshall’s twin conceptions of the 
federal-Indian relationship, the Supreme Court of the late nineteenth 
century actively undermined those conceptions by enlarging, without any 
apparent constitutional limit, the federal government’s power over the 
Indian peoples’ lives and resources.  This judicial enlargement of federal 
power over the Indian peoples culminated in the Supreme Court’s 1886 
decision in United States v. Kagama.37  
                                                 
35. 31 U.S. 515. 
36.  I earlier criticized, in a slightly different context, Marshall’s failure 
to determinatively define the Indian peoples’ legal and political relationship to the 
United States: 
 
Pragmatically, Marshall’s tribe served as a protean policy device, 
content empty and to be filled in by future federal governments as 
the tribe’s guardian.  By revisioning the tribe’s role as America’s 
ward, future federal guardians could resolve any emerging 
contradictions or paradoxes created by the American people’s 
changing attitudes towards the Indian peoples and their need for 
more Indian land.  This device supported the American people’s 
growing conviction that the dwindling tribes should not be entitled 
to assert exclusive sovereignty over vast expanses of hunting and 
roaming lands that could easily accommodate thousands of non-
Indian farmers, ranchers and future industrialists. 
 
Cross, supra note 25, at 901–02 (footnote omitted). 
37.  118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
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 The Kagama Court upheld the Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885,38 
not on the basis of Congress’ delegated power under the Indian Commerce 
Clause as asserted by the United States, but as the exercise of its extra-
constitutional guardianship power over the Indian peoples.  Without any 
hint of irony, Justice Miller’s opinion in Kagama converted Chief Justice 
Marshall’s “Indian protectorate” analogy into a license for Congress’ 
exercise of an extra-constitutional power not subject to judicial review or 
limitation: 
 
It seems to us that [the Major Crimes Act] is within the 
competency of Congress.  These Indian tribes are the 
wards of the nation.  They are communities dependent on 
the United States.  Dependent largely for their daily food.  
Dependent for their political rights.  They owe no 
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no 
protection.  Because of the local ill feeling, the people of 
the States where they are found are often their deadliest 
enemies.  From their very weakness and helplessness, so 
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal 
Government with them and the treaties in which it has 
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and 
with it the power.  This has always been recognized by 
the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, 
whenever the question has arisen.39  
 
 The Supreme Court later baldly restated Congress’ extra-
constitutional guardianship power over the Indian peoples, describing it as 
“plenary” in character, in its 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.40  
Justice White’s opinion for the Court rejected Lone Wolf’s claim that the 
“tribal consent” provisions of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge41 
judicially constrained Congress’ power to unilaterally allot the Kiowa and 
Comanche’s treaty-established lands.42  The Kagama and Lone Wolf 
decisions effectively ended any hope of continuing Marshall’s tribal 
sovereignty doctrine as an effective check on federal governmental 
overreaching into the lives and rights of the Indian peoples. 
 
                                                 
38.  23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885). 
39.  Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84 (third emphasis added). 
40.  187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
41.  Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians, 15 Stat. 581 
(1867). 
42.  Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 561. 
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B. How the Supreme Court’s Re-conception of the Federal-Indian Trust 
Relationship Facilitated the Late Nineteenth Century Rise of the “Indian 
Administrative State” 
  
 The Supreme Court’s reformulation of Marshall’s twin 
conceptions underlying the federal-Indian trust relationship likewise 
facilitated Congress’ de jure and de facto delegation of an almost judicially 
unchecked regulatory discretion over the Indian peoples’ lives and 
resources.  This discretion was given first to the BIA and then later to a 
virtual “alphabet soup” of federal regulatory and land management 
agencies—the ACOE, the BOR, the F&WS, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), among others.43  
 With the Supreme Court’s acquiescence, if not active support, the 
so-called “Indians’ agency”—the BIA—was empowered during the late 
nineteenth century to establish the “Indian administrative state.”  Through 
the exercise of its delegated regulatory powers, the BIA eventually 
established a “shadow” government to extend federal control over 
virtually every aspect of Indian life within Indian country.44  It was, 
ironically, the bureaucratic result of this new reality of Indian life—the 
Indian peoples’ vulnerability to the BIA’s capricious and arbitrary power 
to withhold treaty or statutory guaranteed Indian food or clothing rations 
to ensure Indian compliance with its regulations—that led the Kagama 
Court to accede to the extra-constitutional reality of federal plenary power 
over the Indian peoples.45  
 The BIA of that era plausibly interpreted its administrative “trust 
duty” to the Indian peoples, endorsed by both congressional and judicial 
acquiescence, as to “kill the Indian so as to save the [potential American 
citizen] within.”46  By the end of the nineteenth century, virtually all of the 
BIA’s regulatory powers and resources were directed toward that goal.  
How and why the Indian peoples survived that era of unbridled BIA rule 
in Indian country has long baffled Indian historians, sociologists, and 
ethnographers.  I certainly don’t know the answer to that question, but I 
do know that it wasn’t the result of the judicial enforcement of the federal 
trust duties and responsibilities the BIA may have owed to the Indian 
peoples.47  
                                                 
43.  See generally Wood, supra note 17, at 139–49. 
44.  See generally GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 142–48. 
45.  See id. at 153–58. 
46.  Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History 
and the Nation’s Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 UALR L. REV. 941, 944 (1999) 
(internal quotations and footnote omitted). 
47.  See Cross, supra note 25, at 916–19. 
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IV.  HOW THE ACCUMULATED CONGRESSIONAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE ABUSE OF INDIAN PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
COMPELLED THE MODERN SUPREME COURT TO REDISCOVER 
MARSHALL’S TWIN CONCEPTIONS OF THE FEDERAL-INDIAN 
RELATIONSHIP  
 
A. Early Judicial Rethinking Regarding the Plenary Power Doctrine 
 
 The Supreme Court did act creatively in the early twentieth 
century so as to rediscover Marshall’s twin conceptions of the federal trust 
and Indian self-determination doctrines.  The Court could no longer ignore 
the all-too-evident and deepened vulnerability of the Indian peoples to the 
unchecked discretion of the federal Indian agencies over their lives and 
property.  The accumulated administrative abuses heaped on these 
dependent peoples forced the Court to resurrect Marshall’s long-
disregarded federal guardianship doctrine.48  
 Appropriately enough, this new judicial understanding of the 
federal trust duty arose in the context of an Indian takings case.  Justice 
Butler, in his 1938 opinion for the court in United States v. Shoshone 
Tribe,49 resurrected Marshall’s characterization of the Indians’ “right of 
occupancy . . . [to be] as sacred and as securely safeguarded as is fee simple 
absolute title.”50  In holding that the Shoshone Tribe was entitled to just 
compensation for the federal taking of one-half of its reservation as a 
resettlement site for another tribe of Indians, Justice Butler seemingly 
restricted the federal government’s hitherto unlimited guardianship power 
over the Indian peoples.  He rejected the federal government’s Lone Wolf-
based defense to the tribe’s action, saying the federal government’s Lone 
Wolf power “to pass laws regulating alienation and descent and for the 
government of the tribe and its people upon the reservation detracts 
nothing from the tribe’s ownership, but was reserved for the more 
convenient discharge of the duties of the United States as guardian and 
sovereign.”51  
  
B. How the Supreme Court “Hit the Political Wall” in Its Effort to 
Rethink the Plenary Power Doctrine 
 
 The Shoshone decision seemingly heralded the revival of a 
judicially revitalized federal trust doctrine.  Such a revitalized doctrine 
                                                 
48.  See generally GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 328–70. 
49.  304 U.S. 111 (1938). 
50.  Id. at 117. 
51.  Id. at 118. 
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must be powerful enough to take account of the deepened vulnerability of 
the Indian peoples due to the unwanted history that had accumulated from 
failed Indian policies.  Such a doctrine would reject that failed history by 
judicially ending those twin evils that had spawned it: the judicially 
unchecked growth of federal power over the Indian peoples coupled with 
the arbitrary exercise of increasingly pervasive administrative discretion 
wielded by the BIA, and now other federal agencies, over virtually all 
aspects of Indian economic, political, and cultural life in Indian country.52  
 But there was to be no new Chief Justice Marshall on the Court, 
no jurist strong and principled enough to revive Marshall’s twin 
conceptions of the federal-Indian relationships so as to compel the modern 
revision of the Court’s clearly wrong-headed Kagama and Lone Wolf 
decisions of the late nineteenth century era.  Instead, the legacy of the 
Shoshone Court’s failed promise is our inheritance of the modern Supreme 
Court’s schizophrenic conception that the federal trust doctrine reenacts 
the federal plenary power doctrine in the guise of its “generalized” and 
“specific” federal trust duty distinctions. 
 Why the Shoshone Court’s legacy remained unfulfilled is best 
explained by Dean Nell Jessup Newton’s analysis of the Indian law 
jurisprudence of the late 1940s and 1950s.53  She cites several intervening 
political events as disrupting further development of an Indian rights 
focused jurisprudence that began with the Shoshone decision.  Newton 
cites Congress’ enactment of the Indian Claims Commission Act54 and the 
Indian Tucker Act55 in 1946 as adversely influencing, if not effectively 
preempting, the future judicial development of an independent, judicially 
monitored, federal trust doctrine.56  
 These two federal jurisdictional acts—generally opening the 
federal courts to Indian breach of trust and related takings claims, but on 
stringent jurisdictional conditions—fundamentally altered the future 
judicial course of the potential development of an adequate and 
                                                 
52.  See Cross, supra note 27, at 466–72. 
53.  See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Court of the 
Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992). 
54.  60 Stat. 1049 (1946). 
55.  Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 505–08 (1887) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
56.  Newton observes that one could ask, “why it is necessary to focus on 
the law created in these ancient claims, if the Indian Claims Commission is no longer 
in existence.”  Newton, supra note 53, at 776.  She answers her own question as 
follows: “The answer is that the formalistic rules developed in Indian Claims 
Commission cases, especially those rules limiting liability and setting the boundaries 
of the permissible, continue to be cited and relied on today, even by the Supreme 
Court.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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independent federal trust doctrine premised on common law legal and 
equitable principles.  The exercise of Congress’ plenary power over the 
Indian peoples—expressed as an act of “congressional grace” in allowing 
eligible Indians access to federal courts—required the eligible Indian 
plaintiffs to accept onerous jurisdictional conditions such as, in the Indian 
Claims Commission (“ICC”) context, the “no interest” rule and the 
“money damages only” remedy.57  
 Although Newton does not say this directly, those contingent 
historical and political events help explain today’s deformed and deficient 
federal trust and fiduciary duties doctrine.  How these events squelched 
the further judicial growth of an independent, judicially monitored, federal 
trust relationship with the Indian peoples is evidenced, in my mind, by the 
Supreme Court’s 1955 opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.58  
Justice Reed, writing for the Court’s majority, held that federal taking of 
aboriginal land titles imposed no just compensation liability on the federal 
government.  Most commentators regard that decision as highly 
deferential to the federal government’s asserted plenary power over Indian 
affairs and as seeking, as part of that deferential attitude, to limit the United 
States’ financial liability for the uncompensated federal takings of 
valuable Indian aboriginal interests in Alaska and elsewhere.59  
 Newton seemingly criticizes the federal courts’ Indian breach of 
trust claims jurisprudence, developed in the context of the ICC Act’s 
unique jurisdictional constraints, as subordinating the Article III judiciary 
to a subservient role in determining the legal parameters of federal liability 
in the Indian breach of trust claims context.60  It is not surprising, then, 
                                                 
57.  See id. at 763–65. 
58.  348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
59.  See Cross, supra note 27, at 473–77. 
60. Newton illustrates her point by arguing: 
 
Because the Indian Claims Commission Act was designed to 
obviate the need for further special jurisdictional acts, the Court of 
Claims reasoned that Congress intended that clause 5 [of the ICC 
Act] could only encompass the same kinds of claims brought 
earlier [under the special Indian jurisdictional acts].  Conveniently 
ignoring the many cases upholding the Department of Interior’s 
administrative power to govern Indians without the need for 
statutory authority, the Court of Claims held that a claim by a tribe 
seeking compensation based on actions undertaken by the 
Government had to rely on a “treaty, agreement, order or statute 
which expressly obligated the United States to perform [any] 
services.” 
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that today’s Indian trust and fiduciary law subsists in a seeming state of 
judicially suspended animation—half alive and half dead.  It hangs 
suspended, halfway between the old “mother may I sue you” Indian breach 
of trust jurisprudence of the ICC era and the modern conception of an 
active, affirmative Indian trust and fiduciary law that seeks to divine and 
protect the best interests of today’s Indian peoples.61  
 
V.  HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE 
TOWARD THE FEDERAL TRUST DUTY HAS RESULTED IN ITS 
DRAMATIC UNDER-ENFORCEMENT IN THE MODERN 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CONTEXT 
 
A. How the Contemporary Supreme Court’s “Two-Track” Conception of 
the Federal Trust Doctrine Fails to Ensure “Fair and Honorable” 
Dealings Between the Federal Government and the Indian Peoples 
 
 Given that it was the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the federal 
plenary power doctrine in the late nineteenth century that resulted in the 
contemporary subjection of the Indian peoples’ remaining lands and 
resources to the broad regulatory discretion of a myriad of federal 
agencies, one might think that the Court would be motivated to reimpose 
in the contemporary era a “full blooded” trust doctrine that synthesizes 
Marshall’s twin conceptions of the historic federal trust duty and Indian 
self-determination doctrines.  But you would be sorely mistaken if you 
were to think that way.  Instead, the modern Supreme Court has embarked 
on a “two track” approach to re-conceptualizing Marshall’s historic federal 
trust doctrine that allows it to “have its cake and eat it too.”  In its new 
“cake eating” mode, the Supreme Court amiably agrees, at the level of 
“track one” of the federal trust doctrine, with the following common law 
formulation of fundamental trust and fiduciary principles as declared by 
Justice Mason of the Australian High Court: 
 
The critical feature of these relationships is that the 
fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or 
in the interests of another person in the exercise of a 
power or discretion which will affect the interests of that 
other person in a legal or practical sense.  The relationship 
between the parties is therefore one which gives the 
                                                 
Newton, supra note 53, at 778 (quoting Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community 
v. U.S., 427 F.2d 1194, 1198 (Ct. Cl. 1970)) (footnotes omitted). 
61.  See Cross, supra note 27, at 473–77. 
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fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or 
discretion to the detriment of that other person who is 
accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his 
position.62  
 
 See, the contemporary Supreme Court would likely say, we do 
recognize today Marshall’s historic conception of the federal-Indian 
relationship as imposing a “generalized” trust duty on the federal 
government to be “fair and honorable” in its dealings with the Indian 
peoples.  But in its “second track” mode of “having its cake,” the Court 
holds that the Indian peoples lack any enforceable legal rights under 
Marshall’s historic scheme unless and until Congress specifically confers 
statutory or regulatory entitlements to bring legal actions to enforce the 
federal government’s “generalized” trust or fiduciary duty to be “fair and 
honorable” in its contemporary dealings with the Indian peoples. 
 
B. How the Mitchell I & Mitchell II Decisions Instantiate a “Two-
Track” Federal Trust Doctrine that Undermines Marshall’s Twin 
Conceptions of the Historic Federal-Indian Relationship 
 
 The contemporary Supreme Court, in its two Mitchell decisions, 
created a “two track” federal trust doctrine that judicially reifies the long 
suspect legal principles underlying the federal plenary power doctrine 
while doing relatively little to promote the contemporary congressional 
policy of Indian self-determination.  Even worse, it enables the Supreme 
Court to commend Justice Mason’s cited circumstantial factors as 
establishing, a la Marshall’s twin conceptions of the historic federal-Indian 
relationship, a “general trust relationship” between the federal government 
and the Indian peoples.63  
 But, as the Supreme Court declared in Mitchell I, the wronged 
Indian party must establish more, much more it turns out in light of Navajo 
Nation, than the mere existence of this “generalized or bare” historical 
trust relationship.  In Mitchell I, the Court concluded that the Indian timber 
allottees had not established the BIA’s liability under the General 
Allotment Act for its alleged mismanagement of the allottees’ trust assets.  
Because the “allottee, and not the United States, was to manage the land”64 
under the General Allotment Act, the Act created only a “limited trust 
                                                 
62.  Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 96–
97 (Austl.). 
63.  See GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 331. 
64.  445 U.S. at 543. 
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relationship between the United States and the allottee that does not 
impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources.”65  
 But upon remand to the lower court, the Quinault plaintiffs cited 
the court’s attention to the Indian Timber Management Act.  This so 
impressed the Court of Claims that it held that the statute created an 
enforceable “specific trust relationship” between the Indian plaintiffs and 
the United States.66  On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower 
court’s holding, stating: 
 
In contrast to the bare trust created by the General 
Allotment Act, the statutes and regulations now before us 
clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to 
manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the 
Indians.  They thereby establish a fiduciary relationship 
and define the contours of the United States’ fiduciary 
responsibilities.67  
  
C. Why Indian Advocates Were Surprised by the Supreme Court’s “Two 
Track” Reformulation of the Federal Trust Doctrine 
 
 The Supreme Court’s relatively few Indian breach of trust 
decisions, prior to the two Mitchell decisions, gave no hint of its coming 
“two-track” reconception of the federal trust doctrine.  Indeed, Indian 
advocates may have thought there was just a “single track” duty as 
evidenced by the Supreme Court’s earlier rationale and holding in 
Seminole Nation v. United States.68  
 In Seminole Nation, individual tribal members, analogous to the 
Quinault allottees, were entitled by treaty stipulation to receive direct per 
capita payments from the interest accrued on a tribal trust fund.  But 
instead of paying this money to individual tribal members, the federal 
government paid it to non-Indian creditors and to the corrupt tribal 
treasurer.  Borrowing from standard trust law, the Court analogized the 
federal government to “a third party who pays money to a fiduciary for the 
benefit of the beneficiary, with knowledge that the fiduciary intends to 
misappropriate the money.”69  What is clear from the Mitchell II and 
Seminole Nation decisions, read together, is that as a matter of federal 
Indian trust law, the BIA or any other similarly situated federal agency 
                                                 
65.  Id. at 542. 
66.  Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
67.  Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224. 
68.  316 U.S. 286 (1942). 
69.  Id. at 296. 
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charged with specific fiduciary duties by law, must structure its 
organizational exercise of its discretion so as to be consistent with the 
governing statutory directives.70  
 
D. The Lower Federal Courts’ Struggle to Operationalize the Two-Track 
Trust Logic of the Mitchell I & Mitchell II Decisions 
 
 Making sense of the Court’s “two-track” trust duty logic defies 
easy articulation or paraphrase.  Prior to the Court’s decision in Navajo 
Nation, the lower courts seemed to interpret that logic in the following 
practical terms: 
 
1. Unlike the common law created and defined doctrine 
of trust and fiduciary duties, the federal trust duty is 
clearly subject to overriding congressional control and 
definition.  Therefore, absent some governing federal 
statute, treaty, or authorized regulatory provision that 
creates, defines, and imposes a trust obligation on a 
federal obligation to specific Indian beneficiaries, a 
federal court may not, by resort of its inherent equitable 
powers, create and impose such trust or fiduciary 
obligations on any federal agency.71  
 
2. But a federal court may use common law trust and 
fiduciary principles to supplement the “law of the trust” 
that is independently established by a specific treaty, 
statute, or regulatory provision.  Judge Lamberth’s 
importation of supplementary common law trust and 
fiduciary principles to inform and develop the statutory 
trust purposes Congress itself imposed on the Interior and 
Treasury departments illustrates this principle.72  But 
while these two “doctrinal sideboards” plausibly 
interpreted the two-track logic of the Mitchell decisions, 
it became clear to the Supreme Court that the lower courts 
were applying its new federal trust doctrine in a practical 
manner that opened the courts too widely to Indian breach 
of trust claims against the federal government.  Even 
though the lower courts routinely required Indian 
plaintiffs to establish a “context specific trust 
                                                 
70.  See GETCHES et al., supra note 28, at 334–35. 
71.  See Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 192 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
72.  See Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 
DYING DOCTRINE  PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/9/2017 12:21 PM 
 
  
232 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. Special Issue 
relationship”73 before they would impose any fiduciary 
obligations on the federal government, the Court 
considered that far too lax a liability standard for 
assessing fair and honorable dealings between the 
paramount sovereign and its Indian wards.74  
 
 Lower federal courts struggled to fairly apply this two-track 
standard in a manner that took into account the Indian peoples’ practical 
dependence on the good faith dealings of the United States.  For example, 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pawnee v. United States, held that 
the Indian plaintiffs established only a general trust relationship between 
themselves and the federal government.  Because they failed to cite the 
government’s breach of any specific statute or federal regulation regarding 
the administration of the Indian plaintiffs’ oil and gas interests, they had 
no breach of trust claim against the federal government.75  
 The federal statutes and regulations that “place[d] the Secretary . 
. . at the center of the leasing of [plaintiffs’] mineral lands”76 served, under 
that court’s application of the two-track logic, to “define the contours of 
the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities.”77  What did the Pawnee 
court have to say about the application of common law principles of trust 
and fiduciary law that should independently obligate courts to protect the 
best interests of the Indian peoples—the admittedly dependent wards of 
the federal government? 
 The Pawnee court held it was not free to “establish different or 
higher [fiduciary] standards”78 because to do so would require the court to 
invade “a function solely of Congress or its delegates.”79  Because, in the 
court’s estimation, the cited statutes and regulations did not sufficiently 
obligate the government to pay the Indian plaintiffs royalties based on the 
highest market value for that trust resource, the court was not free to 
“establish different or higher standards.”80  
 Interestingly, the Pawnee court makes no mention of its decision’s 
potential impact on the affected Indian peoples’ capacity for self-
                                                 
73.  Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1563 
(10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
74.  Id. 
75.  Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 191. 
76.  Id. at 189.  
77.  Id. at 192 (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id.  
80.  Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 192. 
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determination, although this matter arose under the 1938 Indian Mineral 
Leasing Act and its implementing regulations.  Assuming that Indian 
mineral development bears directly on the affected Indian peoples’ 
capacity to achieve meaningful self-determination, it would seem that 
active judicial supervision of the federal government’s general trust 
obligation to prudently manage those entrusted Indian resources should 
discipline the federal trustee to work diligently toward that common goal.  
For the federal courts to do so would be consistent with their historic 
solicitude for the Indians’ interests, given their deepened vulnerability to 
both federal and private power in today’s economic and technological 
setting where “information is power” and the Indian peoples lack 
meaningful access to either information or power. 
 Instead, the Pawnee decision reprises the “two-tier” federal trust 
duty analysis derived from the Mitchell I and Mitchell II decisions.  Tribal 
plaintiffs must first show the existence of a “general trust relationship” 
between themselves and the federal government.  Then, they must show 
the existence of a situation-specific trust relationship between themselves 
and the federal government as well as an actionable breach of that 
relationship. 
 My essay’s focus is on the impact of these decisions on the federal 
government’s contemporary trust obligation to promote Indian self-
determination, not necessarily on the legal ability of the Indian peoples to 
obtain a money damages remedy against the federal government.  My 
concern is that the Supreme Court will “throw out the baby of Indian self-
determination” in order to cool the “bath water” of potentially untold 
Indian breach of trust claims that may arise in the Indian self-
determination context.  In my view, the Court’s decision in Navajo Nation 
is a doctrinal preemptive strike designed to prevent Indian advocates from 
financially exploiting the likely multifarious instances of incompetent or 
indifferent federal Indian trust administrators who may fail to effectively 
or prudently promote the self-determination interests of the Indian 
peoples.  Partly due to its traditional public fisc protecting responsibility 
in this regard, I argue that the Supreme Court, in its Navajo Nation 
decision, has radically reinterpreted the contemporary Indian self-
determination policy.  It judicially re-characterizes that policy as an 
additional federal jurisdictional barrier to Indian breach of trust claims.  
By subsuming the contemporary Indian self-determination doctrine into 
its 1950s era Indian jurisprudence, the Court emphasized its fisc protecting 
role via its stringent limitation on the Indian peoples’ actionable claims 
against the federal government and risks reducing Indian self-
determination to a near dead letter. 
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E. A Brief Digression on How the Supreme Court’s Misperception of 
Indian Trust Agencies’ Competing “Public Representational” 
Responsibilities May Allow Them to Disregard Their Trust or Fiduciary 
Duties to the Indian Peoples 
 
 The Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Nevada v. United States81 
substantially re-worked the agency discretion component of the federal 
trust doctrine.  The federal government sought belatedly in that matter to 
fulfill its trust duty to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.82  It did so by filing 
suit to reopen a 1913 Nevada water rights decree known as the “Orr Ditch” 
decree.  In that earlier water rights litigation, the federal government had 
admittedly failed to claim, on behalf of the tribe, “sufficient waters of the 
Truckee River . . . [for] the maintenance and preservation of Pyramid 
Lake, [and for] the maintenance of the lower reaches of the Truckee River 
as a natural spawning ground for fish.”83  
 But Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court, rejected the 
federal government’s admitted breach of trust as sufficient grounds for re-
opening the Orr Ditch decree.  He responded to the federal government’s 
argument, stating that “[w]hile [private trust and fiduciary principles] 
undoubtedly provide useful analogies . . . they cannot be regarded as 
finally dispositive of the issues . . . [particularly when] [t]hese concerns 
have been traditionally focused on the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the 
Department of the Interior.”84  In Rehnquist’s mind, federal agencies, 
other than perhaps the BIA or IHS, clearly “cannot follow the fastidious 
standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his single 
beneficiary solely by representing . . . conflicting interests without the 
beneficiary’s consent.”85  
 Given the reality and complexity of today’s federal agencies 
publicly representing Indian and non-Indian interests that are potentially 
in competition, Rehnquist opined that the federal trust doctrine must be re-
worked so as to accommodate the broadened public representational duties 
of agencies such as the BOR.  Rehnquist makes this new context for 
evaluating the federal trust duty crystal clear: “The government does not 
‘compromise’ its obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to 
                                                 
81.  463 U.S. 110 (1983). 
82.  See id. at 118. 
83.  Id. at 119 (quoting App. to Pet. Cert. at 155a–56a, Nevada, 463 U.S. 
110) (internal quotations omitted). 
84.  Id. at 127. 
85.  Id. at 128. 
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represent by the mere fact that it simultaneously performs another task for 
another interest that Congress has obligated it by statute to do.”86  
 Given the Supreme Court’s new public representational context, 
does this mean that so-called “non-Indian” federal agencies—the BOR, 
F&WS, USFS, or NPS—have broad discretion in their treatment of the 
Indian peoples who, like other constituent groups, are entitled to fair public 
representation of their interests by those agencies, but only within the 
confines of their general statutory and regulatory mandates?87  In the 
absence of some particular statutory, treaty, or regulatory provision 
singling out affected Indian peoples for agency “trust duty” treatment, I 
am afraid that may be the case.88  
 But achieving tribal self-determination will require this “alphabet 
soup” of federal agencies to do much more than implement, consistent 
with governing executive orders, cursory tribal consultations with those 
Indian peoples who may be severely affected by their proposed projects 
and programs.  Indeed, current psychological research concludes that such 
anemic, and potentially insincere, means of empowering hitherto 
powerless groups may do more harm than good.  Ms. Shauhin Talesh uses 
federal agencies’ “tribal consultation” processes as an example of how to 
disempower people: 
 
Learned helplessness has been applied in . . . the federal 
government’s consultations with Native American tribes.  
Despite the proliferation of tribal consultation 
requirements by federal statutes and policies, Native 
Americans’ suggestions and requests have been 
repeatedly “disregarded, discounted, misunderstood, or 
ignored when they are solicited.”  Consequently, the 
Native Americans have developed a somewhat 
submissive, passive approach to such negotiations 
because their suggestions are consistently ignored.  After 
years of failed negotiations, tribes begin to develop a 
“‘learned helplessness’ response, after years of being 
taught that whatever they say, the only thing worth 
spending energy on is learning to cope with the imposition 
of unacceptable alternatives.”  In response, the 
government may “interpret the resulting tribal non-
responsiveness as intransigence, or hostility 
(appropriately), and may in the end make decisions in 
                                                 
86.  Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128. 
87.  See id. at 141–42. 
88.  See Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d 1325. 
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reaction to those interpretations instead of in reaction to 
tribal suggestions (inappropriately).”  This situation leads 
to feelings of lack of control, passivity, and 
submissiveness which, in turn, are likely to cause further 
damage to Native American interests.89  
  
Doubtless, there have been many successful tribal-federal consultations 
that have resulted in the alteration of federal projects and programs so as 
to genuinely accommodate Indian concerns and interests.  But, insofar as 
federal agencies retain the ultimate discretion to disregard the Indian 
peoples’ legitimate self-determination interests, such government-to-
government consultations are not an adequate substitute for a judicially 
supervised and enforced federal trust duty to realize those self-
determination goals.90  
  
VI.  REINTERPRETING THE FACTS AND ISSUES AT STAKE IN 
NAVAJO NATION: READING THE FEDERAL TRUST DUTY AND 
INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION DOCTRINES AS 
COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING 
CONCEPTS 
 
A. My Plan and Rationale for Analyzing Navajo Nation 
 
 My basic argument, so far, has been that Marshall’s original twin 
concepts of the federal trust duty and Indian self-determination co-exist in 
a fundamental means-end relationship: the shared goal, as reflected in 
America’s “constitutional” documents of federal Indian law—its Indian 
treaties, Indian trade and intercourse legislation, and Marshall’s Indian law 
opinions—asserts the federal trust duty as the means to ensure the 
continued cultural and social survival of the Indian peoples.  To restore 
Indian self-determination as both the practical and logical goal to be 
realized by a revitalized federal trust doctrine forces me to confront the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Navajo Nation.  That decision, in my 
estimation, seeks to judicially sever the twin concepts of Indian self-
determination and the federal trust duty by judicially restating them as 
                                                 
89.  Shauhin A. Talesh, Breaking the Learned Helplessness of Patients: 
Why MCOs Should Be Required to Disclose Financial Incentives, 26 L. & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 49, 83–84 (2002) (quoting Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian 
Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of 
Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 28 (1999–2000)) (footnotes omitted). 
90.  Id. at 83. 
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inherently antagonistic and incompatible goals of contemporary federal 
Indian law. 
 In responding to this challenge, I borrow from Professor Paul 
McHugh’s critique of the contemporary New Zealand judiciary’s inability 
to reconcile its inherited common law conception of national sovereignty 
with the Maori peoples’ lawsuits to enforce “treaty principles,” 
particularly the Maori peoples’ right of self-determination as arguably 
established by the Maori version of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.91  That 
judiciary’s rock solid commitment to its late nineteenth century common 
law conception of an “indivisible sovereignty”92 vested in the 
contemporary New Zealand government precludes it from giving legal 
credence to the Maori peoples’ claims that they, like the Indian peoples of 
America, possess inherent and treaty-recognized rights of self-
governance.93  
 McHugh concludes that only the fundamental reconstruction of 
the inherited “common law mind”94 of New Zealand’s judiciary will 
enable it to “constitutionally” view the Maori version of the 1840 Treaty 
of Waitangi as a legal document on par with New Zealand’s other sources 
of constitutional legitimacy.95  He does not hold out much hope for the 
success of such a project, and he counsels the Maori peoples to politically 
bypass the unresponsive New Zealand judiciary and take their case for 
self-determination directly to the New Zealand Parliament and people.96  I 
apply McHugh’s conception of the reconstructed judicial mind in a reverse 
sense in arguing for the contemporary American judiciary’s restoration of 
Marshall’s twin “constitutional” conception of the federal trust and Indian 
self-determination doctrines.  Contrary to the New Zealand experience, it 
was the United States Supreme Court’s late nineteenth century rejection 
and subordination of the Indian peoples’ original sovereignty, in favor of 
its federal plenary power doctrine, that vaulted the federal government into 
its present day role in federal Indian law.  The Court’s recent decision in 
Navajo Nation, in my estimation, mechanically restates that doctrine in the 
guise of federal sovereign immunity to suit in the context of the Indian 
breach of trust litigation. 
 My focus on the Indian self-determination component of that 
decision may require a brief explanation and a personal disclaimer.  
                                                 
91. See P.G. McHugh, Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown 
Sovereignty in New Zealand, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 69 (2002). 
92.  Id. at 82. 
93.  See id. at 82–86. 
94.  Id. at 78. 
95.  See id. at 78–82. 
96.  See McHugh, supra note 91, at 98–99. 
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Frankly, I am not that interested in whether Indian peoples may recover 
money damages from the federal government for its alleged breach of its 
trust obligations to the Indian peoples.  I don’t believe that money can ever 
compensate for the accumulated wrongs inflicted by the federal 
government on the Indian peoples. 
 However, I do care very much about establishing the appropriate 
judicial regard and understanding of the complementary roles to be played 
by Marshall’s twin conceptions of the Indian self-determination and the 
federal trust duty in the modern conception of federal Indian law.  For 
these reasons, I focus on the Supreme Court’s reevaluation of the Indian 
self-determination doctrine.  I especially analyze this decision’s potential 
for the judicial jettisoning of its role as the Indian peoples’ last line of 
defense to the potential abuse of the federal guardianship power. 
 
B. The Basic Facts of the Navajo Nation Decision 
 
 The facts of this case are relatively straightforward. The Navajo 
Nation entered into a lease agreement in 1964 with the predecessor in 
interest to Peabody Coal Company for coal mining on tribal lands.  The 
coal company agreed to pay a per ton royalty rate of $0.375.  The Interior 
Secretary was authorized to adjust the royalty rate to a “reasonable” level 
on the twentieth anniversary of that lease.  As that adjustment date 
approached, the tribe discovered the market price of coal had risen and the 
royalty was then equivalent to about two percent of the gross proceeds.  
No one disputed that the existing royalty rate was well below the 
prevailing market-based royalty rates.97  
 Tribal negotiations with the coal company were unsuccessful in 
resolving the adjusted royalty rate and other pending issues relating to the 
potentially amended coal leases.  So the tribe asked the Interior 
Department to resolve the royalty rate issue and set a fair market value for 
the tribe’s amended royalty rate.  The Bureau of Mines analyzed the fair 
market value of the Navajo coal and recommended a royalty rate of twenty 
percent as the new rate in the amended coal leases.  The lower level 
officials of the BIA adopted this recommended royalty rate and the Navajo 
Area Director notified the coal company of its proposed decision. 
 But the coal company appealed that decision to Mr. John Fritz, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs.  He affirmed the decision 
to require a twenty percent royalty rate in any amended Navajo coal leases.  
Fritz’s decision was later withdrawn by Donald P. Hodel, the Interior 
Secretary.  Both the Navajo people and the coal company were informed 
                                                 
97.  Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 495–96. 
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by Fritz “that a decision on th[e] appeal is not imminent[,] and [the 
Secretary] urge[d] them to continue with efforts to resolve this matter in a 
mutually agreeable fashion.”98 However, the tribe was not informed that 
there had been “numerous contacts” between lobbyists for the Peabody 
Coal Company and Mr. Hodel during this time period.  These contacts had 
resulted in a secret secretarial decision in favor of the Peabody Coal 
Company.99  
 The tribe sued, claiming that the Secretary’s action was in the best 
interests of the Peabody Coal Company, not the Navajo people as required 
by the federal trust duty.  The federal appeals court agreed with the tribe, 
holding that Mitchell II’s federal “control and supervision” requirement 
over Indian trust assets was met in this case, and therefore Hodel’s action 
in “‘suppress [ing] and conceal[ing]’ the decision of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary [for Indian Affairs]”100 had violated the fiduciary’s fundamental 
duty of loyalty to its beneficiary.101  That breach of trust by the federal 
government, the lower court held, “is subject to remedy by assessment of 
damages resulting from the breach of trust.”102  
 
C. A Brief Summary of the Oral Arguments in Navajo Nation 
 
 Reconstructing the “judicial mind” on a given legal topic 
sometimes occurs in the oral argument phase of a case that presents hard 
questions for judicial resolution.  Personally, I am not sure whether the 
oral arguments in Navajo Nation really offered the counsel for the Navajo 
Nation a fair chance to educate the court about the proper relationship 
between the federal trust duty and Indian self-determination doctrines.  By 
contrast, I believe the counsel for the federal government effectively 
exploited the Navajo Nation’s breach of trust claim against the United 
States for $600 million in damages.  He used that claim as an opportunity 
to re-characterize the Indian self-determination doctrine as a practical 
factor to be weighed in the Court’s threshold jurisdictional determination 
as to whether the federal government owes any trust or fiduciary duties to 
the affected Indian people in a particular context.  For this reason, I briefly 
cite the exchange between the Court and the respective counsels during 
the oral argument in this case. 
 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the government’s appeal from 
the Federal Circuit’s decision and set the matter for oral argument on 
                                                 
98.  Id. at 497 (quoting App. 117) (internal quotations omitted). 
99.  Id. at 498. 
100.  Id. at 501 (quoting Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1332). 
101.  Id. 
102.  Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 501–02. 
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December 2, 2002.103  Mr. Edwin Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, 
presented the oral argument on behalf of the United States.  He invited the 
Court to rule against the Navajo Nation on the grounds that the Interior 
Secretary had not abused his agency’s regulatory discretion over Indian 
trust resources and that the tribe had failed to demonstrate any 
vulnerability to whatever missteps taken by the Secretary in the procedural 
administration of regulatory duties in this matter.  Mr. Kneedler’s basic 
argument to the Court is summed up in his opening statement: “Because 
there was no violation of any act of Congress or regulation of an executive 
department, much less one that could fairly be interpreted as mandating 
the payment of damages by the Government, there is no cause of action in 
this case under the Tucker Act.”104  
 He reiterated his basic assertion in response to Justice O’Connor’s 
question whether Secretary Hodel’s private conversations with lobbyists 
for the Peabody Coal Company provided the basis for a breach of trust suit 
by the Navajo Nation.  “No” was his emphatic answer.105  At best, he 
replied, these facts may provide the tribes with an APA-based action to set 
aside the coal lease in question, but the tribe has declined to take that 
action.106  
 His narrow view of the federal trust duty in this instance, Kneedler 
argued, was occasioned by two factors.  First, broad discretion was vested 
in the Interior Secretary by the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act.  Second, 
the Navajo Nation exercised the lead and determinative role in negotiating 
the Peabody coal lease at issue.107  These two factors, in his mind, 
distinguished this case legally and factually from the federal “control and 
supervision” trust duty standard established in Mitchell II.  Unlike the BIA 
timber managers in Mitchell II, the Interior Secretary was clothed in this 
instance with broad discretion to “‘flesh-out’ [via regulations] the regime 
for . . . approval of [Indian mineral] leases.”108  
 Given that the Secretary’s regulations established only a minimum 
royalty payment requirement, the fact that he ultimately approved a 
tribally negotiated royalty rate of 12.5 percent meant he had clearly 
exceeded the lower bound of the trust responsibilities to the affected 
Indians. 
                                                 
103.  See id. at 488.  
104.  Oral Argument at 4, Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (available in 2002 
WL 31741814). 
105.  Id. at 5. 
106.  Id. at 4–6. 
107.  See id. at 18. 
108.  Id. at 17. 
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 But it was Kneedler’s tribal self-determination argument that 
seemed to attract the most attention from the Justices.  Given that the 
IMLA’s goal was to promote direct tribal negotiations with private 
development interests, Kneedler explained that the Secretary 
understandably sought to promote such tribal negotiation opportunities 
through his adoption of minimal regulatory standards.  Such a regulatory 
strategy helped ensure that tribal negotiations would proceed without 
undue federal interference or involvement.  He encapsulated, in 
paraphrase, the Secretary’s “pro-self-determination” stance as follows: “It 
is clearly up to the tribal negotiators and lessee to go beyond these 
minimums if they so choose.”109  
 But one unidentified Justice directly challenged Kneedler’s “the 
tribe did it” argument by questioning whether mere regulatory compliance 
with minimal trust duty standards relieved the Secretary of any 
independent fiduciary duties over and above this regulatory minimum: 
Doesn’t the Secretary of Interior have to meet the common law fiduciary 
duty of “reasonable, prudent care no matter what the regs [say]”?110  
Kneedler disagreed, contending that Mitchell II-type liability arises only 
from an express statutory direction to the Secretary to “[assure] a particular 
amount of income for the tribe under the circumstances.”111  He pointed 
out that any such express statutory direction was clearly absent in this case. 
 The Justice sought to inject, with some humor, a Mitchell II-type 
analogy.  Suppose, the Justice asked Kneedler, we equate the Peabody 
lobbyists who met with the Secretary to “anti-tree termites” let loose by 
BIA foresters to “eat away” the ethical timber that supports the federal 
trust duty?  Kneedler replied, without humor, that the Justice’s 
hypothetical “anti-tree termites” would pose an immediate threat to a real 
physical asset.  For that reason, such federal behavior would likely 
constitute a breach of the trust duty even in the absence of a statutory 
directive to refrain from such behavior.  By comparison, Kneedler 
continued, the complained of ex parte communications between the 
Secretary and the lobbyists for Peabody Coal posed only a remote and 
ultimately meaningless procedural threat to the Navajo’s coal resource.112  
 When it was the turn of Mr. Paul Frye, legal counsel for the 
Navajo Nation, he had been boxed in by Kneedler’s legal arguments.  The 
Court’s majority seemed to accept Kneedler’s characterization of the 
Secretary’s admittedly shabby actions as actually promoting the Navajo 
                                                 
109.  Oral Argument at 18–19, Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (available in 
2002 WL 31741814). 
110.  Id. at 20. 
111.  Id. 
112.  See id. at 23–24. 
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Nation’s exercise of its self-determination by requiring it to return to the 
negotiating table with Peabody Coal.  If one accepts Kneedler’s 
characterization of the effects of the Secretary’s actions as having the 
effect of actually promoting the Navajo Nation’s lead role in negotiating 
its coal lease with Peabody Coal, then it is plausible to argue that any 
procedural missteps by the Secretary were subsumed into his regulatory 
approval of the coal lease the tribe freely negotiated with Peabody Coal 
Company. 
 Therefore, many of the Court’s questions to Frye focused on the 
tribe’s role, not the Secretary’s role, in managing and controlling the lease 
negotiations with Peabody Coal Company.  One Justice asked Frye, given 
the IMLA’s language, whether Secretary Hodel had not been obligated to 
take “reasonable” account of the impact of the proposed twenty percent 
royalty rate on both Peabody Coal Company and the Navajo Nation.113  
But it was Justice Ginsburg’s questions about the tribe’s negotiation of an 
eight percent severance tax on coal to be mined by Peabody Coal under 
the amended lease that truly confused the federal trust issue with the tribe’s 
independent exercise of sovereign taxing powers over tribal mineral 
lessees.  By adding together the 12.5 percent royalty rate approved by the 
Secretary and the tribally negotiated eight percent severance tax, Ginsburg 
asked Frye, didn’t the tribe succeed in negotiating a better deal via self-
determination than if the Secretary had unilaterally imposed the twenty 
percent royalty recommended by lower level federal officials?114  
 My purpose in re-hashing the oral argument is not to critique how 
well the respective counsel did in presenting their arguments to the Court.  
Each of them did as well as they could in light of their resources at hand.  
My purpose is to show how the tribal self-determination doctrine was 
seized on by the Court to avoid the tribe’s breach of trust claim in this 
context.  Kneedler’s “the Indian tribe did it” argument seemed to be met 
with great receptivity by those members of the Court who desired to 
further narrow the reach of the federal trust doctrine.  By re-characterizing 
the federal trust duty as merely a procedural obligation to comply with 
minimal regulatory requirements of secretarial review and approval over 
tribally negotiated mineral lease agreements, Kneedler sought to shift the 
financial and practical risks of tribal development to those Indian peoples 
who seek to use the development of their mineral resources as one means 
of realizing their economic self-determination.115  
  
                                                 
113.  See id. at 39. 
114.  Oral Argument at 43–45, Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (available in 
2002 WL 31741814). 
115.  See generally id. at 3–27. 
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D. How the Application of My Proposed New Judicial Canon of 
Construction May Have “Reconstructed” Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion in 
Navajo Nation 
 
 The final paragraph of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Navajo 
Nation illustrates the ultimate judicial result of the fundamental 
misapprehension by the Court’s majority of the complementary character 
of the federal trust duty and Indian self-determination doctrines: 
 
However one might appraise the Secretary’s intervention 
in this case, we have no warrant from any relevant statute 
or regulation to conclude that his conduct implicated a 
duty enforceable in an action for damages under the 
Indian Tucker Act.  The judgment of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is accordingly 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.116  
  
 Ironically, while the three dissenting justices explicitly call for a 
“balanced standard”117 that appropriately interprets the “tension between 
IMLA’s two objectives”118 of “greater tribal responsibility”119 and the 
Secretary’s obligation to “ensure that negotiated leases ‘maximize tribal 
revenues,”’120 they fail to express any such standard beyond a few 
platitudinous remarks about the need for a “modest standard []”121 that 
mediates this supposed tension.  Beyond criticizing the Court’s majority 
for “giv[ing] the whole hog”122 to the “interest of tribal autonomy”123 
expressed in the IMLA, the dissent says little about how to reconcile the 
supposed tension between the federal trust duty and Indian self-
determination.  Indeed, the dissent seems to agree generally with the 
majority’s view that these two doctrines are at war with one another.  The 
dissent agrees that there is a “zero sum” relationship between the two when 
                                                 
116.  537 U.S. at 514. 
117.  Id. at 518 (Souter, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting). 
118.  Id. at 517. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. (quoting Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 
195, 200 (1985)). 
121.  See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 518 (Souter, Stevens & O’Connor, 
JJ., dissenting). Justice Souter, for example, characterizes “[t]he Secretary’s approval 
power . . . [as] a significant component of the Government’s general trust 
responsibility.”  Id. at 516 (emphasis added). 
122.  Id. at 518. 
123.  Id. 
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Justice Souter writes, “The more stringent the substantive obligation of the 
Secretary, the less the scope of tribal responsibility.”124  The converse of 
Justice Souter’s principle—the greater the tribal responsibility assigned by 
statute, the less the scope of the federal trust duty—is doubtless true as 
well. 
 Why am I practically troubled by the dissent’s seemingly 
reasonable call for a “balanced standard” that mediates the supposed 
tension between the federal trust duty and the Indian self-determination 
doctrine?  Because the “zero sum” analysis of any issue practically and 
logically excludes any possibility of a balanced standard that will 
supposedly resolve the tensions presented therein.125  Post Navajo Nation, 
Indian advocates are advised by the Supreme Court to embark on an 
ultimately fruitless and disheartening quest for the “balanced standard” 
that will supposedly resolve, when all has been said and done, what is an 
irreconcilable “zero sum” conflict. 
 But the escape from what I consider to be a false and contrived 
conflict between these two doctrines—designed to further dampen Indian 
breach of trust suits that may open the federal government to potentially 
open-ended liability for the bad acts of administrative officials—is 
relatively simple and will further the joint and “non-zero sum” interests of 
both the Indian peoples and the federal government.126  I apply below my 
proposed standard to reanalyze the issues raised in this matter.  This 
standard seeks to reinforce the common “non-zero sum” interests of the 
Indian peoples and the federal government, thereby avoiding the 
internecine and irreconcilable conflict needlessly generated by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Navajo Nation. 
 Applying my new proposed non-zero sum approach to the issues 
presented in Navajo Nation is neither radical nor innovative in character.  
At level one, it simply recapitulates the well established concept that 
Congress, not the federal courts, should, as the Indian peoples’ trustee, 
determine the nature and contours of contemporary Indian self-
determination policy.  At level two, it takes seriously Congress’ 
contemporary Indian self-determination policy so as to give a “non-zero 
sum” interpretation to the issues raised in Navajo Nation. 
                                                 
124.  Id. 
125.  Robert Wright makes the cogent point that “common conceptions of 
justice and social equality” don’t just “magically prevail ‘in the end’ without extra 
guidance.”  WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 84–85.  His logic applies directly, in my mind, 
to the need for a “full blooded” federal trust doctrine that forces the federal Indian 
agencies to engage in meaningful “government-to-government” relations with the 
Indian peoples so as to actively promote the goals of Indian self-determination. 
126.  Id. 
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 I embody this “non-zero sum” principle in a new Indian canon of 
judicial construction.  This new canon is, itself, the practical and logical 
corollary of Congress’ declared “non-zero sum” approach to Indian self-
determination.  Element one of Congress’ approach encourages the Indian 
peoples to engage in self-help efforts to achieve their particular vision of 
economic or social self-determination.  Element two of its approach 
assures the Indian peoples that the needed technical or financial support 
will be forthcoming from the federal government to assist them in their 
self-determination efforts. 
 The judicial adoption of my proposed new Indian canon of 
construction would substantially promote Congress’ declared “non-zero 
sum” approach to Indian self-determination.  First, it would restore Indian 
self-determination to its rightful place in federal Indian common law as 
the “mirror image” doctrinal complement to Marshall’s original “Indian 
protectorate” concept of the federal trust duty.127  Second, it would provide 
the essential “judicially-backed” incentive to the federal trustee to be an 
active, engaged manager who consciously shapes his discretionary 
choices, ex ante, so as to select those projects, activities, or investments 
that will promote the best interests of his wards—the Indian peoples.  
Third, it will promote “non-zero sum” collaboration and responsibility-
sharing agreements between the federal government and the Indian 
peoples for new and truly innovative self-determination undertakings.  
Because the Indian peoples will not risk the loss of their trustee’s informed 
and active help and support, given their choice to participate in these new 
joint undertakings, the goal of Indian self-determination will be 
substantially furthered.  Third, a judicially backed “non-zero sum” 
approach to Indian self-determination may well dampen the number of 
future instances where federal administrators, due to their possible 
inefficient or negligent behaviors, expose the federal government to Indian 
breach of trust claims.  This is because responsibility-sharing 
arrangements in the “non-zero sum” context are based on shared 
information flows, mutual transparency of intent and purpose within joint 
decision making matrices, and the parties’ orientation to maintaining a 
long-term relationship that seeks to avoid any disruptions based on short 
run misunderstandings or conflicts between the parties.128  
                                                 
127.  Referring to the Indian peoples, Marshall held that “weak state[s], in 
order to provide for [their] safety, may place [themselves] under the protection of one 
more powerful, without stripping [themselves] of the right of government, and ceasing 
to be . . . state[s].”  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561. 
128.  Robert Wright could have been speaking about the long and troubled 
federal-Indian relationship when he asks us to assess the movement from the “zero  
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 My proposed Indian judicial canon of construction would require 
federal courts to presume that Indian self-determination statutes preserve 
the historic rights Indians have traditionally enjoyed under the federal trust 
relationship, unless Congress clearly expresses its intent to the contrary 
within the “four corners” of a given Indian statute.  This canon would 
apply to all self-determination statutes, including the 1938 Indian Mineral 
Leasing Act as it was so characterized by the Supreme Court in Navajo 
Nation.  If my proposed Indian canon of construction had been employed 
by the Court’s analysis in Navajo Nation, I believe its decision would have 
been different in the following regards. 
 First, Justice Ginsburg would decide the “expert analysis” issue 
differently.  Through Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, the Court held that 
Interior Secretary Hodel was free to disregard the Bureau of Mines’ expert 
assessment of the appropriate market value of the Navajo coal reserves 
because no express statutory or regulatory provision required him to 
conduct an independent expert analysis of those Indian resources.129  
Under my proposed “non-zero sum” analysis, Justice Ginsburg would 
have held, as Judge Schall held in the lower court’s concurrence, that 
Secretary Hodel breached his fiduciary duty to be adequately informed 
about the market value of the Navajo’s coal reserve so as to make a 
                                                 
sum” to the “non-zero sum” society over the very long term: 
 
As we’ve seen, in the process of expanding, non-zero-sumness has 
brought not only more respect for more people, but more liberty 
for more people.  The point isn’t just—as thinkers as Adam Smith 
have been saying since the eighteenth century—that free markets 
are best operated by free minds.  The point is that the ongoing 
evolution of information technology heightens this synergy, 
underscores it, makes something rulers can less and less afford to 
ignore. 
 
The world remains in many ways a horribly immoral place by 
almost anyone’s standard.  Still, the standards we apply now are 
much tougher than the standards of old.  Now we ask not only that 
people not be literally enslaved, but that they be paid a decent wage 
and work under sanitary conditions.  Now we ask not only that 
dissidents not be beheaded en masse, but that they be able to say 
whatever they want to whomever they want.  It is good that we thus 
agitate for further progress, and all signs are that this agitation goes 
with the flow of history.  Still, it is hard, after pondering the full 
sweep of history, to resist the conclusion that—in some important 
ways, at least—the world now stands at its moral zenith to date. 
 
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 208 (footnotes omitted). 
129. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 511. 
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decision on the royalty rate issue that helped promote the joint, “non-zero 
sum” interests shared by the federal and Indian governments in realizing 
the economic self-determination goals of the Navajo people.130  
 Second, Justice Ginsburg would decide the issue of Secretary 
Hodel’s ex parte contacts with the lobbyist for Peabody Coal differently 
under my proposed Indian canon of judicial construction.  Justice 
Ginsburg actually held that Secretary Hodel was free to meet with 
whomever he wants, absent an express statutory or regulatory prohibition 
against his doing so.131  Under my proposed “non-zero sum” analysis, 
Justice Ginsburg would hold that Secretary Hodel’s setting aside of the 
expert-recommended twenty percent royalty rate for the Navajo coal, 
based on his clearly disloyal private contacts with the coal company’s 
lobbyist, would have constituted a breach of trust as held by the lower 
federal court. 
 Third, Justice Ginsburg would decide the issue regarding the 
Senate Report’s express language exhorting Secretary Hodel to manage 
the Navajo’s coal resources so as to “give the Indians the greatest return 
from their property,”132 differently under my proposed Indian canon of 
judicial construction.  Justice Ginsburg actually held that this cited report 
language was inapplicable to the case because it “overstate[d]”133 the 
Secretary’s fiduciary duties and because its use was an effort to impose an 
“extratextual”134 criteria of analysis to the Secretary’s actions.  Under my 
proposed “non-zero sum” analysis, Justice Ginsburg would hold Secretary 
                                                 
130. Non-zero sumness is viewed by Robert Wright as an inherent “self-
regenerating” source that reinforces our natural tendency to cooperate and work 
together for our mutual benefit: 
 
Non-zero-sumness is a kind of potential. Like what physicists call 
“potential energy,” it can be tapped or not tapped, depending on 
how people behave. But there’s a difference.  When you tap 
potential energy—when you, say, nudge a bowling ball off a 
cliff—you’ve reduced the amount of potential energy in the world.  
Non-zero-sumness, in contrast, is self-regenerating.  To realize 
non-zero-sumness—to turn the potential into positive sums—often 
creates even more potential, more non-zero-sumness.  That is the 
reason that the world once boasted only a handful of bacteria and 
today features IBM, Coca-Cola, and the United Nations. 
 
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 339. 
131. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 513. 
132.  Id. at 516 (Souter, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Sen. 
Rpt. 75-985, at 2 (1937)) (internal quotations omitted). 
133.  Id. at 511–12 n.16.  
134. Id.  
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Hodel in breach of his fiduciary obligations to the Navajo people for 
failing to use his discretionary power to secure a financial return 
commensurate with the expert-determined market value of the Navajo’s 
coal resources. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The judicial adoption of my proposed “non-zero sum” analysis, 
embodied in my proposed Indian cannon of judicial construction, would 
achieve a reasonable and practical synthesis that restores Marshall’s twin 
conceptions of Indian self-determination and the federal trust duty to their 
rightful, respective roles in contemporary federal Indian law.  I hope my 
brief essay arguing for the reconstruction of the “judicial mind” regarding 
the federal trust duty in an age of tribal self-determination advances the 
academic discussion of this issue. 
 
 
